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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report focuses on Surface Transportation (ST), both fixed and route-based, and the 
growing threats to their information technology (IT) infrastructures. As an industry, ST 
seeks to optimize the movement of people and goods, while ensuring safety and resiliency 
and minimizing environmental impact. Cyber threats are a powerful medium for those with 
the political, social, and economic motivations and wherewithal to disrupt and destroy 
existing ST systems. Yet with current funding levels, often determined as about 4% of the 
IT budget, the cybersecurity industry struggles to protect organizations in fields ranging 
from federal and state governments to private industry.
The ST industry’s current drive to improve services and reduce costs through automation 
is rapidly leading to advances that will be even more difficult to protect if security measures 
are not built-in from the start. It is a truism that soon every physical system will be remotely 
controllable over the Internet. Yet all systems that are theoretically controllable for legitimate 
purposes can also be accessed for malicious purposes. The access given to the trusted 
insider may also provide access to the attacker.
What are the odds of an attack, and how much must be spent in order to prevent one? 
Attackers need only be successful once; defenders need to be successful every time. The 
acceptance of this reality results in different security strategies and resiliency response plans.
In order to address the above, this paper follows the structure detailed below:
• Cyber State of Affairs provides an overview on the current level of cybersecurity in 
the ST industry in three sections. The first underlines that a successful cybersecurity 
initiative is predicated on understanding and modeling the problem completely. It 
also provides an industry overview of current cybersecurity practices. The second 
underlines just how inadequate current protection from cyberattacks is. The third 
proposes a better way of understanding and modeling cyber threats.
• Managing Cyber Risks and Business Exposure, also divided in three sections, 
provides a more detailed approach to understanding various cybersecurity issues 
and management strategies to abate them. The first section aims to illustrate 
attackers’ motives. The second section identifies typical cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
and risks faced by organizations. The somewhat larger third section proposes 
improved management structures and underlines the roles of different departments 
within a typical organization in helping address cybersecurity issues.
• Conclusion: Eleven Lessons Learned summarizes the above two sections into 
eleven key ‘lessons’ regarding the current state of cybersecurity in ST organizations 
and introduces the proposed Surface Transportation Cyber-Protection Model and 
Reference Architecture detailed in Part B of this paper.
The ultimate objective is to develop a new paradigm to define, describe, design, and 
deploy the most effective protection, at the lowest cost, in the shortest time within the limits 
of available resources. This paper seeks to initiate a critical peer discussion to explore 
innovation in the cyber protection of ST systems. 
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I.  CYBER STATE-OF-AFFAIRS
Cyber systems are virtual and, therefore, difficult to manage. The ephemeral nature of 
network connections, computers, and digital data makes defining and understanding their 
inherent risks very challenging. As a result, it is also difficult to justify and quantify the 
degree of protection and associated level of investment that are needed when the threats 
are not well-understood.
Understanding the physical world, as opposed to the virtual, is relatively straightforward, 
since it is tangible and measurable. To affect the real world, it is necessary to get into 
contact with it. The virtual world removes this constraint, enabling remote access to devices 
that control physical systems.
Using the cyber world as a means to disrupt real world events has proven to be very 
effective. For example, the Stuxnet computer worm, considered the world’s first digital 
weapon, is credited with successfully disrupting Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear 
weapon.1 Appendix C provides examples of threats or events that demonstrate the 
implications of poor cybersecurity on the physical operation of railway systems. If cyber 
security measures are insufficient, disruptive malware can unwittingly be distributed to 
vast numbers of endpoints overnight.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first, entitled The Truth of the Matter 
Matters, describes the two major software engineering approaches to cybersecurity and 
illustrates how more and more physical and logical systems are remotely controllable via 
an Internet connection. The second, The New Normal is Inadequate, illustrates the large 
degree to which current cybersecurity practices, especially in the Surface Transportation 
(ST) industry, are lacking. The third, There Must Be a Better Way, provides a high-level 
overview of the potential solutions that are explained in greater depth later in the paper.
THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER MATTERS
For most ST organizations today, an imminent cyberattack would result in nothing short 
of a disaster. Although some comfort can be gained in the knowledge that peers within 
the ST industry are not alone in this issue, 
the reality is that most companies most likely 
underinvest in cybersecurity and hence are 
dangerously exposed.
In software engineering, there are two schools of 
thought on designing cybersecurity: secure-by-
design and secure-by-default. Secure-by-design 
systems are designed from the “ground up” to be secure from threats, while secure-by-
default systems are designed to have the default configuration settings be the most secure 
settings possible, sometimes at the expense of user-friendliness.2 Yet both design patterns 
are rarely found in current ST systems, requiring security to function as a Band-Aid, which 
increases the complexity of the necessary security measures, downgrading performance 
and user experience.
The question is not: Have we done 
enough? The answer is clear—no 
one has done enough.
The question is: What do we do 
about it now?
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Increasingly, physical systems are being virtually controlled by applications accessed over 
the Internet. A common example of this phenomenon in surface transportation systems is 
the use of industrial control systems, which are commonly used to control subways and 
other rail infrastructure. If these applications are accessible over the Internet for legitimate 
purposes, then they can be compromised and accessed for malicious purposes as well. 
The only thing that separates the two is intent.
The attempt to provide security does not always entail adequate protection. There are 
many reasons why protection is especially difficult to achieve, even when security has 
been provided. Ineffective security often results from basic factors such as improper 
configuration of security measures and poor basic information technology (IT) hygiene. 
Inadequate funding is also responsible for ineffective security, as it naturally degrades 
over time. Security management often suffers from inadequate communication and 
measurement, which is then exacerbated by the difficulty of tracking threats.
Protecting a complex organization with bad IT is impossible. Humans are often the weak 
link for specialized social engineering attacks. An example of this is ransomware attacks, 
where IT or other employees are baited into clicking on a link which subsequently installs 
malware on their system, potentially allowing an infection of other systems within the 
organization. The malware then allows the attacker to steal data and hold it at a ransom. 
Cybersecurity is now far too complex to be managed by humans, yet the main tool used 
in security today by practitioners is Microsoft Excel.
THE NEW NORMAL IS INADEQUATE
Fortunately, through breach notification laws, we are learning of breaches almost daily. 
Unfortunately, the high exposure to these breaches has numbed our senses. The recent 
breach of a credit score company, releasing the detailed financial data of 143 million 
Americans, reflected a new low in standard of care.3 In the ST domain, a 2016 breach 
exposing 57 million accounts of a global taxi technology company remained undisclosed 
for more than a year.4 The company later paid a $100,000 ransom to the hackers to delete 
their copy of the stolen data.
The question after a cybersecurity breach asked by those who are harmed is always: 
Did they do enough? In most cases, more should have been done, and lawsuits claiming 
inadequate care are routine. Historically, most breaches have been traced back to the 
exploitation of IT vulnerabilities that were well known and for which patches were available 
for over a year (see Appendix B).
The IT vulnerabilities in the transportation domain are no different. Transportation providers 
(both public and private) are dependent on IT systems similar to those employed by other 
industries, and thus are just as likely to under-invest in cybersecurity measures. Even 
when the proper investments are made, there is no reason why a malicious Organized 
Attacker Group, given sufficient time and resources, cannot take control of a critical surface 
transportation system that is legitimately accessed and controlled over the Internet.
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THERE MUST BE A BETTER WAY
There are many reasons why security has failed to provide adequate protection. Security 
cannot provide protection at all costs, because such a goal is financially unfeasible. There 
must be a reasonable level of investment to provide adequate protection, meeting the 
security expectations of customers at a price they are willing to pay.
Security after design—namely, where security is introduced as an after-thought—is less 
effective and costlier to maintain than security-by-design—namely, where security is 
integrated into the architecture of the IT system from the ground-up. Unfortunately, when 
it comes down to a choice between more features in a system and more cybersecurity, 
security is often the loser. In these all-too-common cases, security must be applied after 
design, making the asset more difficult to protect.
Additionally, the importance of maintaining good system hygiene and a minimal, well-
hardened attack surface has also been ignored. With most of today’s compromises resulting 
from the exploitation of known vulnerabilities in IT assets, keeping them securely configured 
and patched is a critical first step towards better hygiene. Once done, it is advisable to 
understand the points of vulnerability—or the “attack surface”—in an IT system. The attack 
surface relates to the IT devices whose IP addresses are exposed to the Internet. The 
number of these public IP addresses should be minimized and highly controlled. Such public 
facing devices should be securely configured and any modification detected.
Today, given the early stages of security automation, processes are manual and humans 
are “in-the-loop” in most aspects of security. Given the severe shortage of experienced 
security professionals and the number of open positions, a large number of inadequately 
trained practitioners have and will continue to enter the space. At the same time, the 
complexity, interconnectedness, and sheer size of existing systems has outpaced most 
humans’ ability to effectively secure them.
To address these problems, the first step is for humans to identify the complexity and size 
of the systems and the degree to which they are automated. Additionally, measures to 
closely track the size, interconnectedness, and weak points of existing systems must be 
put in place. The next step is then to visualize and analyze such information, which will 
allow for better understanding of security weaknesses across all strata of ST organizations. 
Additionally, this level of understanding will allow security systems to be automated, 
allowing for more efficient counter-hacking measures.
Unfortunately, current cybersecurity best practice standards and regulations and the ability 
of most organizations to implement them fall short.5 In response, this paper proposes the 
basis for an enhancement of how security controls are defined, interpreted, measured, 
visualized, and communicated. The proposed enhancement will greatly improve existing 
methods to define, measure, and represent an organization’s state-of-security, state-of-
protection, and state-of-compliance, hence allowing for the ability to develop and deploy 
more effective countermeasures to security threats.
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The proposed enhancement is a taxonomy advancement called the Security Control 
Expressions (SCE). A SCE explicitly describes the relationship between security delivered 
by security assets and the protection received by business assets. Cyber threats and 
countermeasures can be expressed, associated, measured, visualized, and analyzed in 
powerful new ways. The impact can be transformational for the security industry, resulting 
in the ability to protect surface transportation systems at adequate levels as soon as 
reasonably possible.
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The preceding sections sought to establish awareness of the many facets of the ST 
industry’s cybersecurity issue, an idea of where organizations currently are, and what they 
are facing. Yet establishing and defining the current issues in the field is not enough.
If cyber risks are not on the minds of business leaders and ST organizations, then new 
approaches to describing the threats and potential damages must be devised. The best 
way to do so is to express the potential impact in financial terms, such as net income 
exposure and current and future revenue growth exposure. When viewed through the 
lens of the bottom line, executive leaders at ST organizations, both public and private, 
can compare the costs and benefits of cybersecurity with other business initiatives. By 
changing the way in which the need for cybersecurity is presented, the urgency of the 
issue can be stated much more clearly.
Unfortunately, it is challenging to express cyber risks in financial terms. This communication 
barrier is responsible for the chasm that exists today between those who work on technical 
issues and those who work in the business realm. This divide between the fiduciary 
business layers and IT security is largely responsible for the universal underinvestment 
in security. Addressing the current issues in cybersecurity management, especially in the 
ST industry, requires addressing many common misconceptions. Key misconceptions that 
routinely endanger cybersecurity are addressed below.
The first common misconception is that security is the sole responsibility of the Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO). This formal position is where all matters cyber are 
centrally managed and reported. However, it is more productive to have a business and 
risk-focused person who can synthesize and communicate to senior executives in language 
aligned to their concerns. An organization without such a position does not have the necessary 
resources to improve their standard-of-care. Cybersecurity is a complex field and requires 
good management practices to avoid the typical waste cycle of security investments.
While CISOs certainly serve a critical role in cybersecurity, there are many other important 
responsibilities that are typically the responsibility of other executives. The objective is to 
manage cyber risk, and there are several risk treatment methods. For example, setting 
and establishing reasonable risk acceptance levels is a fiduciary responsibility that guides 
businesses on the question of the limits of the risk they should accept. Risk indemnification, 
transfer, and avoidance risk treatment measures are the purview of the legal team and the 
General Council. A common error is that CISOs commonly report to the Chief Information 
Officer (CIO). Because the CIO is concerned with rapid advancement and cost reductions 
rather than cautiousness and the inherently 
costly nature of cybersecurity, it is a conflict of 
interest for the CISO to report to the CIO. For 
this reason, the CISO should instead report to 
the General Council or the Chief Risk Officer, 
which will be able to better handle the difficult 
and costly tradeoffs regarding cybersecurity. 
Stop the intent of the attack.
Stop them from getting out, not 
from getting in.
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A second reality that must be accepted is the recognition that it is virtually impossible to stop 
a persistent, well-resourced, and sophisticated attacker. It is therefore important to focus 
beyond denial-of-access measures (also known as “fence building”) to hackers and other 
security threats, but to also develop the capabilities to constrain movement, detect anomalous 
behavior, and ensure that attackers cannot exit systems with important information. These 
counter-measures require a different set of security skills and technologies compared to 
simply denying access. compared to simply denying access. These skills are centered 
around data analysis, anomalous behavior detection, and fraud prevention.
It is important to think strategically and plan tactically about how to stop the intent of the 
attack, as opposed to only the attack itself. The attack has a motive, and it is not limited 
to just getting in. One way to understand the motive of the attacker is by tracking their 
movements once they have gained access to your system. However, it takes a mature 
organization to track an attacker without the attacker’s awareness, since security response 
actions provide indicators to the attacker that they have been detected. Once an attacker 
is aware that they are being tracked, they become much more difficult to find as they often 
go into “sleep” mode, yielding little information to the trackers watching them.
The following sections provide a detailed outline of the problem and the approaches to 
solving it. First, the different motives of potential attackers are discussed in the following 
subsection, entitled “Why Would They Attack Me?”. Next, “Cyber Risks Created by 
Cyber Threats” details specific cybersecurity risks to organizations. Lastly, “Cyber Risk 
Management and Achieving a Reasonable Standard-of-Care” outlines a management 
structure to effectively handle cybersecurity at all stages of a potential attack, assigning 
roles to each department within a typical ST organization.
WHY WOULD THEY ATTACK ME?
The following section describes distinct types of cybersecurity threats faced by the 
ST industry. Each type of threat includes either possible targets within ST systems or 
successful attacks targeting the particular vulnerability. These threats are summarized 
below in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Cyber Threats by Motive & Intent
• Cyber Terrorism: The intent is to disrupt the target’s physical systems by remotely 
taking over control systems and either shutting them down, opening them up, 
destabilizing them, or otherwise operating them beyond design limits. The impact 
of a cyber-terrorist taking control of a target’s IT system is dependent on the design 
and operational characteristics of that system, but it has been shown that logical 
(virtual) actions can lead to real world, kinetic events. An example of a specific 
threat of this type in the ST industry is attacks on rail balise systems, which convey 
real-time information about train and track positions. These systems have been 
found to have significant security vulnerabilities in existing literature.6
• Cyber Crime: The intent is to steal health, financial, and personal information of 
employees and customers for money through identity theft and financial fraud.
• Cyber Espionage: The intent is to steal transportation technology secrets, 
intellectual property and proprietary information, such as pricing, for competitive 
gain, lowering their own costs of development and shortening the time it takes to 
enter the market with these new technologies.
• Cyber Hacktivism: The intent is to dispense punishment for a real or perceived 
injustice. This can include disclosing confidential data or interrupting the normal 
operation of a ST system. An example of this came in 2011, when hackers infected 
a website for the Bay Area Rapid Transit police union, and released the personal 
information of over 100 officers to protest the agency’s shutting down of Wi-Fi in 
underground tunnels.7
• Cyber Extortion: The intent is to take sole control of data for profit, make it 
unintelligible by malicious encryption, and demand compensation for its reliable 
recovery. One example of such an attack in the ST industry is the 2016 San Francisco 
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Municipal Transportation Agency ransomware hack, where hackers compromised 
more than 2,000 servers at the agency, holding confidential information at a ransom 
of 100 bitcoin.8
It is essential that we have an unbiased, scientific view of the cyber threat landscape. 
Appendix B references the U.S. Secret Service and Verizon data breach investigations, 
now in their tenth year. These documents exemplify state-of-the art thinking and an 
unbiased analysis of the current cyber threat landscape.
CYBER RISKS CREATED BY CYBER THREATS
What damages can result from the above threats, if realized? The following are ST-specific 
risks that can be realized from cyber threats. The nature of the damages varies by the 
impacted asset. Risk is proportional to the likelihood of the compromise being realized 
multiplied by its impact. Each risk detailed below is associated with a potential outcome or 
concrete consequence of an attack that has been carried out on a ST system in the past. 
These risks are displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Cyber Threats Creating Business Risks
• Delivery Risk: The inability to deliver and operate products and services; this is 
largely a risk incurred by cyber terrorism. An example of this risk being realized 
occurred in a 2014 Michigan experiment, where researchers were able to break into 
a local network of traffic lights, gaining control of almost 100 intersections.9
• Customer Risk: The loss of passenger confidence in the safety and reliability of 
system after a cybersecurity breach. For many transportation agencies, however, 
the lack of competition means this risk is less significant compared to others. Those 
relying on public transportation as a primary mode of transportation rarely have 
alternative options.
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• Competitive Risk: Financial loss resulting from theft of trade secrets, proprietary 
information, and intellectual property.
• Disclosure Risk: The theft and unauthorized release of personal customer 
and employee data. Although this normally regards customer data, as in the 
aforementioned taxi company breach, employee data is a target as well; in 2016, 
ISIS-affiliated hackers broke into a New Jersey Transit police website and published 
officers’ personal information and names on Twitter.10
• Product Risk: Financial loss resulting from liability claims of inadequate care in 
preventing system compromises. 
The risks defined above can be separated into two categories. Delivery and product 
risks largely pertain to the physical components of a surface transportation system, 
exemplified in the examples provided of such risks being realized. Delivery risk can be 
thought of as impacting the operation of existing components, while product risk can 
be thought of as impacting the design and integrity of the components themselves. The 
other risk categories pertain to breaches and leaks of sensitive data, be it the personal 
data of employees or customers, or trade secrets—for example, in the autonomous 
vehicle industry. Appendix A contains further information on risks and risk management 
strategies specific to rail infrastructure.
CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT AND ACHIEVING A REASONABLE 
STANDARD-OF-CARE
When realized, the above risks create financial exposure. Financial exposure is the cost 
of liabilities related to claims of inadequate care, breach-related costs where customers 
must be notified and protected, and fines from regulators, which vary depending on the 
findings of the incident. Financial exposure does not include the costs of conducting day-
to-day security.
Addressing and managing this financial exposure is one of the key foci of the following two 
subsections. Additionally discussed are concrete management structures and processes 
that are necessary to achieve an appropriate standard-of-care—the level of due care 
exercised by agencies, operators, and companies—in ST organizations.
Stakeholder Journey to Reasonable Standard-of-Care
Figure 3 illustrates the management cycle of assessing and improving the cybersecurity 
standard-of-care, and consequently reducing residual exposure. Each step in the process 
is associated with the specific department within an organization that is responsible for it 
(left of the figure).
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Figure 3. Standard-of-Care Evaluation Cycle
Key to Figure 3 are the two distinct sides. The left side illustrates the current level of 
protection, its associated risk, and the residual exposure. The right side illustrates the 
desired future standard-of-care, the risk treatment, and methods for future protection 
against that risk. Assessing levels of protection, both current and future, is the role of the 
Security, Risk & Compliance, and IT departments. Transferring this information to tangible 
financial and legal ramifications is the role of the Financial and Legal departments. 
Interpreting this data and deciding on the acceptable exposure and standard-of-care is 
the role of the Board of Directors, Audit Committee and the Executive Committee.
The first step in the journey to an acceptable standard-of-care is assessing the residual 
exposure, defined as the potential financial loss incurred if the accepted risk is realized. 
This exposure level should reasonably allow an organization to recover after a successful 
attack. To assess whether the level of residual exposure is appropriate, a quarterly review 
and decision cycle must be put in place in order to keep the standard-of-care up-to-date with 
the organization’s infrastructure. If an organization has excessive residual exposure, and 
potential financial loss from an attack is not financially recoverable, then the organization 
must improve the standard-of-care. 
Key to the concept of residual exposure is understanding the role and size of the ST 
organization within a broader ecosystem of services and other organizations, knowing the 
potentially valuable assets of one’s organization, and the motives of a potential attack. By 
knowing one’s state of security and therefore how protected business assets are, one can 
estimate the residual exposure.
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Based on the result of the assessment, fiduciary management determines whether the 
nature and level of risk and exposure is reasonable or excessive. If deemed excessive, 
investments are made to improve the standard-of-care. This process includes addressing 
the sources of potential risks with different treatment options and investing in in risk 
mitigation. It also includes selecting and deploying additional protection measures designed 
to protect against specific threats.
The overall objective of this cycle is to ensure the adequate protection of the most critical 
dependencies of the most valuable processes with the highest exposure. This strategy 
ensures that with limited time and resources, the most important risks are taken care of 
first. The process starts with understanding which assets underpin which type of risk, level 
of severity, and likelihood. Once this is understood, measures can be taken to reduce both 
the likelihood and impact.
Cyber Response by Stakeholder and Attack Stage
An accurate, clear, and concise set of terms describing the processes of cyberattacks 
and their induced responses is key to improving responses to and reducing the costs of 
addressing cyber threats. This section outlines a set of terms defining the progressive 
stages of a successful attack, the responses incurred at each stage of an attack, and the 
roles of each stratus of an organization during a stage of attack.
Before identifying responses to an attack, it is important to understand how a cyberattack 
occurs. Defined below are the progressive stages of a successful attack.
• Attack: Organizations are attacked thousands of times a day, even tens of thousands 
of times if they are high-value targets. For example, financial, health, or technology 
companies typically house valuable personal information and intellectual property, 
making them frequent targets of cyberattacks.
• Compromise: An attack has been successful and the attacker is “inside the network” 
performing unauthorized activities with malicious intent. Some organizations have 
no idea if they are compromised or not.
• Incident: Once detected, the compromise becomes an incident and incident response 
is initiated. Less mature organizations often attempt to shut down impacted systems 
and remediate immediately, telling the attackers that they have been found. More 
mature security organizations start a cat-and-mouse game to contain the attacker 
without the attacker knowing, with the objective to learn their intent and discover the 
full implication of the compromise.
• Breach: The objective of responding to an incident is to prevent it from becoming a 
breach. A breach should not be confused with being compromised. Rather, breach 
is strictly reserved as a term that implies a strong legal response must be triggered. 
If an incident was successfully contained, it does not constitute a breach.
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The only opportunities for an organization to respond to an attack are during the 
compromise and incident stages. Any attempt to engage with attackers after an attack is 
successful is risky and potentially illegal, as indicated in an example cited earlier in this 
paper, where a global taxi technology company ended up complying with a $100,000 
ransom payout to hackers.
Since the form of the risk and corresponding countermeasures vary by attack stage, it is 
best to look at cyber risks as the attack materializes, progresses, and changes. Based on 
this approach, appropriate responses by different stages are illustrated in Figure 4, and 
are as follows:
Figure 4. Cyber Response by Attack Stage
• Before Stage: The objective is to prevent an attack from becoming a compromise. 
This first response stage focuses on governance and building a corresponding 
security program (i.e., an ability to protect) that is deemed reasonable by key external 
stakeholders. Therefore, responses in this stage are focused on ‘fence building,’ with 
the objective of keeping the attackers out. However, at a certain point, additional 
investments in such security measures will have diminishing protection returns. At 
that point, a shift in strategy to the next stage of responses is recommended.
• During Incident Stage: The focus of this stage is to contain the incident and prevent 
it from escalating into a breach, the successful intent of the attack. If the intent of the 
attack also triggers a public event, such as Breach Notification Laws, it is a breach 
that also causes reputational damages. This moves the response to the next stage.
• During Breach Stage: The focus of this stage is to accomplish everything in the 
previous stage while dealing with authorities, regulators, investors, and customers 
without causing additional damages. As a result, we often see a significant shift in 
resources from technical to legal and communication at this stage.
• After Stage: The objective of this stage is to contain breach damages and rebuild. 
The effects of the breach stage often linger beyond the days in which the attack is 
“in the news,” often years. Less tangible values such as trust and reputation lost can 
take a very long time to rebuild. This stage also involves legal liability claims, on-site 
auditor presence, and annual audits for several years.
Based on the cyber risk management decision cycle, attack stages, and response stages 
as discussed previously, Figure 5 illustrates a corresponding response matrix, broken 
down by stakeholders, underlining the role of each department at an organization in cyber 
risk management.
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Figure 5. Response by Stakeholder and Response Stage
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III. CONCLUSION : ELEVEN LESSONS LEARNED, AND A 
CYBERSECURITY MODEL FOR SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
Society’s commercial track record for security-by-design and security-by-default in logical 
systems security is, unfortunately, not very strong in most cases. This is due in part to the 
perceived unwillingness of the end customers to pay for the higher cost of security-by-
design. This trend is changing as the pain and damages from cyber threats get closer to 
the consumer.
If the past is any indication, surface transportation systems will rush to innovate without 
fully understanding the cybersecurity implications, let alone designing and implementing 
secure-by-design or secure-by-default systems. The further security measures are from 
the built-in design of a system, the more complex and difficult such a system is to protect.
Product liability and the standard of due care is interpreted differently in the physical 
and digital worlds. Harm in the physical world is clearer than “digital” harm. Providers of 
surface transportation systems are more likely to be liable for product safety failings than 
a software platform provider would be for insecure third-party applications.
Relying on old paradigms and refusing to accept new truths make the job more difficult 
and are a sure way to destroy value quickly. Defining key assumptions and presumptions 
accurately will greatly improve the effectiveness of the strategy and resulting security 
posture. Below are eleven key lessons learned from previous sections of the paper and 
important truisms of the cybersecurity industry. 
1. Prime Directive: Not all assets are of equal 
sensitivity, criticality, or business value. 
Given scarce cybersecurity resources, 
the most valuable assets should be 
protected first, the second-most valuable 
second, and so on. The idea is that, by 
the time resources have been exhausted, 
the most important system elements have 
been adequately addressed. The Security 
Scarce Resource Prime Directive, in the text box above, should guide where to 
invest in cybersecurity. This assumes a knowledge of assets, where they are, and 
what they are doing.
2. Presumption: Today, security strategy must build sufficient resiliency to continue to 
deliver the product and services securely to customers while being compromised. 
This is the reality, and no security officer can be held to the standard to prevent any 
and all possible attacks. Most organizations contain many assets of value to attackers. 
Organizations of value are under constant attack and therefore in a constant state 
of response to multiple incidents, fraud attempts, and investigations. This is simply 
the reality. This presumption shifts security investments towards monitoring internal 
activity, detecting unauthorized behavior, and responding with preventative controls 
to stop the activity.
Security Scarce Resource 
Prime Directive
“Ensure the adequate protection 
of the most critical dependencies, 
of the most valuable processes, 
with the highest exposure.”
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3. Security is a Degree-of-Difficulty: Any target can be compromised given enough 
time and resources. The easier it is to compromise a target, the more likely less 
sophisticated and resourced attackers will do so. How difficult should it be? There is 
no device on an organization’s network that cannot be compromised if it is accessible 
and controllable via that network. If it can be accessed for legitimate reasons, it can 
be accessed for malicious reasons. The more difficult it is to accomplish each stage 
of the attack, the less likely it is to be successful. As the difficulty level increases, the 
number of attackers with the skills, resources, and persistence to accomplish the 
compromise decreases.
4. Stop Them from Getting Out: It is more critical for a business to stop the intent 
of the attack, rather than the attack itself. Stopping hackers from getting out of the 
system with critical data is more important than trying to keep them from getting in. 
This is key to preventing an incident from escalating to a breach. 
5. Why Would I Be Attacked: As discussed in Section 3, understanding the vulnerability 
of one’s organization is largely a matter of understanding one’s role in the larger ST 
ecosystem and the assets that are of value to potential hackers. 
6. Fix IT First: Companies rarely maintain core IT best practices. Maintaining good 
software and hardware hygiene is half the security battle. The risks and need for 
security originates in large part from the major challenges of protecting bad IT. And 
bad IT in most cases is a result of underfunding. More sophisticated countermeasures 
to address more sophisticated and persistent attackers with more sinister intents 
are not effective if the basics are left wide open and a teenage attacker is able to 
penetrate an organization. 
7. Minimize and Harden Attack Surface: An organization’s “attack surface” is defined 
by the number of Internet-facing IP addresses and their connected devices, each of 
which is a potential point of vulnerability to be exploited by an attacker. The key is 
to minimize the number of public IP addresses and ensure that connected devices 
are securely configured, cannot be modified without detection, and all applicable 
software patches are up to date. The likelihood of an attack is strongly associated 
with the size and condition of the attack surface.
8. Protection versus Security: Businesspeople care about protection; security people 
care about security. Security delivered does not equal protection received. Business 
assets are under threat, and whether a security technique to mitigate that threat 
is effective or not, it must be verified using accepted test procedures, preferably 
conducted by an independent evaluator. A security technology can be operating 
“effectively” (as designed), but the efficacy of the technique against the threat may 
be poor. For example, detection of known malware will be 100% effective in detecting 
the exact same malware, but will detect almost no new attacks, because the attack 
signature of almost every new attack is different. 
9. Internal vs External Control Frameworks: External frameworks are “one size 
fits all,” objective-level security control sets that either organizations should comply 
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with (according to industry standards) or organizations shall comply with (according 
to government regulations). There are many external frameworks to choose from, 
and they evolve on a periodic basis.11 There is nothing “wrong” with these control 
frameworks, except that they may not align with the nature of a business and 
specific risk profile, which, in turn, highly depends on the nature of core assets and 
activities. An internal framework provides alignment between the security program, 
the business, and the risk communication.
10. Compliant vs Secure: Out of a scarcity of resources and a desire to reduce 
complexity and duplication, organizations sometimes adopt a well-known and widely 
accepted external framework as their internal enterprise control framework. In doing 
so, they avoid the costs and time involved with managing another specialized, internal 
framework by complying with the standards of an external framework—an approach 
sometimes called security-by-compliance. However, a compliant environment is not 
necessarily secure. But it is almost certain that a secure environment is always 
compliant. Therefore, it is highly advisable that any organization should adopt an 
internal security control framework optimized to their intrinsic character and aligned 
to risks to their net worth, current revenue, and revenue growth. These business 
priorities are translated into Management Business Objectives and managed 
through to delivery and success. The internal framework should be based on a set 
of Management Security Objectives tied to each of the business objectives with the 
goal to protect it. 
11. Approach to Security: Each leader will have a somewhat different intrinsic 
approach to cybersecurity determined in part by their personality, education, and 
past management experience. These differences will, in turn, influence management 
methods, communication styles, and approaches to building a security program, 
or lack thereof. Examples of approaches include: a technology and risk mitigation 
approach, where the focus is on IT measures to reduce the likelihood of a compromise; 
a legal, risk averse, and indemnification approach, where legal instruments such 
as contracts to specify onward care obligations are used to assign responsibility 
outside the organization to limit exposure; a check-list and security-by-compliance 
approach, where external compliance regulations drives the nature of the security 
program; and a business and risk acceptance approach, where business tends 
to take on excessive risks. When only one approach is dominant, other types of 
risk are inappropriately addressed and under-managed. It is important to seek the 
right balance of risk treatment measures provided by specialized experts while also 
ensuring a powerful, accountable and conflict-of-interest-free reporting chain.
To address the current lack of adequate cybersecurity in ST organizations, Part B of this paper 
proposes a Surface Transportation Cyber-Protection Model and Reference Architecture, 
which outlines the assets specific to transportation systems that have the potential to be 
compromised by hackers. This model and reference architecture incorporates the motives 
and risks discussed above, and integrates the following essential considerations:12
• Hybrid: Physical and cyber systems, since cyber systems increasingly control 
physical systems.
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• Multi-disciplinary: Technical, legal, regulatory, and fiduciary aspects of system 
design and management.
• Integrated: Moving from the strategic to the tactical and moving from objectives to 
implementation techniques.
• Community-based: Participant ecosystem roles and responsibilities.
• Standardized: “One Ecosystem Protection” provides security to entire systems.
• Multi-Regulatory/Standard-Based: Adequate protection that meets all external 
security regulatory and standards.
• Demonstrable: Measurable across a spectrum of perspectives to increasing 
degrees-of-precision. 
The Model is composed of three key elements. The cyber threat component provides the 
ability to understand potential threats. The cyber protection component allows organizations 
to model courses of action and countermeasures to threats. The surface transportation 
model identifies the common potential layers of attack in surface transportation systems.
Each element of the model has an underlying reference architecture, that is, a framework 
through which it is modeled and understood. The cyber threat reference architecture 
illustrates the steps of a successful cyberattack. Its cyber protection counterpart illustrates 
how to defend against each one of these steps. The surface transportation reference 
architecture points to specific infrastructural weaknesses within each layer of a surface 
transportation system.
Through a holistic model such as the above and better understanding of key cybersecurity 
concepts and attack processes, we hope to foster an interdisciplinary debate on strategies 
for mitigating and managing cyberattacks on surface transportation topics. We also hope 
to underline the sheer lack of and need for stronger security for both physical transportation 
systems and the data associated with them.
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APPENDIX A: RAIL SECURITY GUIDANCE
1. US Government: DHS: Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA): https://
www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis
2. Best Practice Recommendations: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/
Recommended-Practices
3. The Future of Smart Cities: Cyber-Physical Infrastructure Risk. https://ics-cert.
us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCIA%20-%20The%20Future%20of%20
Smart%20Cities%20-%20Cyber-Physical%20Infrastructure%20Risk.pdf
4. Government of United Kingdom: Rail Cyber Security Guidance to Industry, 
February 2016: https://www.rssb.co.uk/Library/improving-industry-
performance/2016-02-cyber-security-rail-cyber-security-guidance-to-industry.pdf
5. TRB’s E-Circular 226: Transportation System Resilience: Preparation, Recovery, 
and Adaptation. Benefits and Needs for an Integrated Approach to Cyber–Physical 
Security for Transportation, Rae Zimmerman, New York University Wagner 
Graduate School of Public Service; Michael G. Dinning, U.S. Department of 
Transportation Volpe Center: http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/circulars/ec226.
pdf 
6. Protection of Transportation Infrastructure from Cyber Attacks: A Primer: http://
www.trb.org/Main/Blurbs/174382.aspx
7. Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 
Rev 4: http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r4.pdf
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APPENDIX B: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT LANDSCAPE
State-of-the-art thinking and unbiased analysis of the threat landscape based on actual 
breach forensics: US. Secret Service and Verizon data breach investigations report, now 
in its tenth year: https://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/
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APPENDIX C: RAIL-RELATED INCIDENTS
1. City of Lodz, Poland tram system hacked by a 14-year-old schoolboy, 
causing derailment and injuries, 2008: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/1575293/Schoolboy-hacks-into-citys-tram-system.html
2. Train virus disrupts signaling, dispatching result in delays across eastern US, 
2003: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/virus-disrupts-train-signals/
3. WannaCryRansomware attack impacts Germany’s Deutsche Bahn system, 
ransomware message appears on station screens, May 2017: 
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-132A; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/13/cyber-attack-hits-german-train- 
stations-hackerstarget-deutsche/
4. “The Indian Railway Minister, Suresh Prabhu has said that ensuring cyber security of 
the railway’s in the day to day operations is one of the most important priority,” July 
2017: http://www.ehackingnews.com/2017/07/railways-to-focus-on-cyber-security.
html
5. UK Rail Infrastructure under Attack, 2016: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/ 
2016/07/12/uk-rail-network-hit-by-multiple-cyber-attacks-last-year/
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ST Surface Transportation
IT Information Technology
SCE Security Control Expressions
CISO Chief Information Security Officer
CIO Chief Information Officer
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MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities:
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
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Mineta Consortium for Transportation Mobility
Research
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas 
include: bicycle and pedestrian issues; financing public and private 
sector transportation improvements; intermodal connectivity 
and integration; safety and security of transportation systems; 
sustainability of transportation systems; transportation / land use / 
environment; and transportation planning and policy development. 
Certified Research Associates conduct the research. Certification 
requires an advanced degree, generally a Ph.D., a record of 
academic publications, and professional references. Research 
projects culminate in a peer-reviewed publication, available on 
TransWeb, the MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu).
Education
The Institute supports education programs for students seeking a 
career in the development and operation of surface transportation 
systems. MTI, through San José State University, offers an AACSB-
accredited Master of Science in Transportation Management and 
graduate certificates in Transportation Management, Transportation 
Security, and High-Speed Rail Management that serve to prepare 
the nation’s transportation managers for the 21st century. With the 
active assistance of the California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans), MTI delivers its classes over a state-of-the-art 
videoconference network throughout the state of California 
and via webcasting beyond, allowing working transportation 
professionals to pursue an advanced degree regardless of their 
location. To meet the needs of employers seeking a diverse 
workforce, MTI’s education program promotes enrollment to 
under-represented groups.
Information and Technology Transfer
MTI utilizes a diverse array of dissemination methods and 
media to ensure research results reach those responsible 
for managing change. These methods include publication, 
seminars, workshops, websites, social media, webinars, 
and other technology transfer mechanisms. Additionally, 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. MTI’s extensive collection of transportation- related 
publications is integrated into San José State University’s 
world-class Martin Luther King, Jr. Library.
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented 
herein. This document is disseminated in the interest of information exchange. The report is funded, partially or entirely, by a grant from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation’s University Transportation Centers Program. This report does not necessarily reflect the official views or policies 
of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability for the contents or use thereof. 
This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation.
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